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RECENT DECISIONS
While the principal cases firmly fix the public policy limitation
in the tax law, they do little to clarify its application. This is espe-
cially true with regard to the operating expenses of an illegal business:
just how far the Sullivan rule will be applied to other illegal businesses
is unclear.
M
TAXATIoN - FEDERAL TAX LIENS - SURETY'S RIGHT HELD
INFERIOR TO FEDERAL TAX LIENS.-In return for a surety's execu-
tion of a performance bond that guaranteed completion of subcon-
tracting work on a Texas housing project, the subcontractor assigned
to the surety all sums due or to become due from the general con-
tractor under the subcontract. These sums were to serve as col-
lateral security not only for losses incurred on the housing project
but for any other indebtedness or liability the subcontractor might
incur to the surety "whether heretofore or hereafter incurred." Sub-
sequent to this assignment, the surety executed for the subcontractor
a second bond covering another job in Kentucky. Then, in sequence,
the Texas work was completed and the subcontractor became entitled
to the sums held by the general contractor, no payment being actually
made: the federal government filed tax liens against the subcontractor;
and finally, the surety was forced to perform under the Kentucky
bond because of the subcontractor's default. In an interpleader ac-
tion to determine whether the federal government or the surety had
the right to the retained percentages still due on the Texas project.
the lower courts 1 held that the surety was a mortgagee under the
provisions of section 3672(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
and therefore its rights took precedence over the government's tax
lien. The Supreme Court, per curiam with four iustices dissenting,
reversed, holding that the tax lien took precedence because the in-
strument creating the surety's right was "inchoate and unnerfected."
United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
A federal tax lien arises when any person liable to pay any fed-
eral tax neglects or refuses to nay the tax after a demand, and it
attaches to all property and rights to nroperty owned by the delin-
quent taxpayer.2 In most cases the lien is a secret charge against
the property, known only to the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue
Service, for it arises at the time the tax assessment is made 3 by the
District Director of Internal Revenue, 4 whose records are not open
I United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex.),
aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956).
2 IxT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6322.
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6203; Treas. Reg. 301.6201-1 (1954).
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to public scrutiny.5 But special protection is afforded "any mort-
gagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor," for as to them the
lien is not valid until it has been filed by the Secretary or his delegate. 6
When the taxpayer is insolvent, satisfaction of the tax lien takes
priority over any other debts he may owe.7 But in other cases the
principle that "the first in time is the first in right" controls, since
the federal statute imposing tax liens does not define the priority of
competing liens.8
However, the Supreme Court has ruled that for any lien to com-
pete successfully with a federal tax lien it must be choate and per-
fected when the tax lien attaches. In United States v. City of New
Britain,9 the Court said that a lien may be considered choate ".. . when
the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the
amount of the lien are established." 10 If all three tests have not
been met at the time the tax lien attaches, the tax lien will prevail.'
In United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank,'2 a case dealing with
an attachment lien, it was held that the lien is unperfected until judg-
ment is awarded and recorded in the suit that caused the attachment.
In determining the question of when a lien is choate, the Court has
been extremely strict in examining liens competing with tax liens.
In brief opinions 13 that do not reveal the reasons for the conclusions
drawn, the Court has regularly subordinated statutory liens to the
federal tax lien. Moreover, a decision by a state court that a com-
peting lien is "choate" is not binding on the federal courts.14
5
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6103, 7213.
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323 (a). The Code provides that the tax lien
may be filed in the following places: in the place designated by the law of the
state where the property subject to the lien is situated; if there is no such place
designated by state law, in the office of the clerk of the district court in the
district where the property is situated; if the property is in the District of
Columbia, the lien is filed in the district court there. Ibid. In New York
City, liens on realty are filed with the county clerks or with the city register,
exclusive of Richmond County. Liens on personalty are filed in the city
register's office in four counties of New York City, the office of the clerk of
the County of Richmond, or in town and city clerks' offices elsewhere. N.Y.
LIEN LAW § 240 (Supp. 1958). The form of the notice of the tax lien is
regulated by federal law and not by state law. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6323 (b).
7 REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952).
8 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
9 Ibid.
10 Id. at 84. This is also the standard used in determining relative priority
of liens under 31 U.S.C. § 191, dealing with the distribution of an insolvent's
assets. See Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
11 347 U.S. at 86.
12 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
13 United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15, reversing per curiam 134 Colo.
543, 307 P.2d 475 (1957); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350
U.S. 1010 (1956), reversing per curiarn 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955) ; United
States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808, reversing per curiain 244 Miss. 33, 79 So. 2d
474 (1955) ; United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
14 United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955).
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In the Ball case, the assignment contract was valid by state law
when made, even though the fund that was to provide the surety's
collateral was not yet in existence. 15 Section 6323, allowing special
protection to mortgagees against tax liens, does not define "mort-
gagee," but the lower federal courts and the dissenting opinion held
that the assignment was a mortgage within the meaning of the sec-
tion because it was an assignment of personal property as security
for the performance of an obligation. Since the sums assigned were
not in existence at the time of the assignment, the mortgage would
technically be a mortgage of after-acquired property 16 and the mort-
gagee's lien by the general rule would arise when the property came
into existence.17 The majority of the Supreme Court referred to the
assignment only as an "instrument" but did not seem to quarrel with
its characterization as a mortgage. Instead, they took the position
that the lien of the surety was "inchoate and unperfected." even
though the federal lien did not attach to the property until after the
sums came into existence and the mortgagee's lien attached.
Applying the New Britain tests to the instant case, it would seem
that the amount of the surety's lien was not fixed when the tax lien
was filed. It was only subsequent to the filing of the tax lien that
the surety's obligation on its bond became an actual liability. To
this extent the decision represents but another precedent indicating
that the courts will find any lien not precisely fixed in amount with
a certitude equivalent to that of a final judgment inferior to a fed-
eral tax lien.' 8
The major importance of the case, however, lies in the fact that
the Supreme Court has for the first time subordinated an antecedent
contractual lien-as opposed to a statutory lien-to a federal tax
lien.' 9 On this ground the decision has been criticized as judicial
legislation extending the "inchoate" doctrine to an area where Con-
gress has by section 6123 protected certain interests without includ-
ing mention of a "choate-inchoate" test.
2 0
The effect of the decision is to make it impossible for a surety,
accepting as collateral security for a contingent obligation money due
or to become due under an existing contract, to protect that security
against a subsequently arising tax lien. Since this form of credit
arrangement enjoys wide commercial use, the implications of the
Is See Southern Sur. Co. v. Bering Mfg. Co., 295 S.W. 337, 341 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927) ; Williams v. Silliman, 74 Tex. 626, 12 S.W. 534 (1889).
16 See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 37-40 (1951).
7Id. §40.
18 See United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956),
reversing per curiam 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955) (mechanic's lien) ; United
States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) (attachment lien);
United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941) (insolvency).
19 See Cross, Federal Tax Claims: Nature and Effect of the Government's
Weapons for Collection, 27 FOR)HAIm L. REv. 1, 27 (1958) ; Plumb, Federal
Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAX L. REv. 459, 475 (1958).
20 Cross, supra note 19. at 29.
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case are far-reaching. There is some hope that two subsequent cases
may point the way to minimizing its effects. In United States v.
Bess,21 the Supreme Court has adopted the position of some lower
courts 22 that the federal tax lien can attach only to the property and
rights to property of a delinquent taxpayer as those rights are de-
fined by state law. And in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States,2 3
the New York Court of Appeals considered a situation analogous to
that of the Ball case. A corporation agreed to do landscaping work
for the New York City Housing Authority, the contract providing
that its right to final payment was conditioned on faithful completion
and payment of all claims for labor and materials. An additional
clause provided that the Authority might condition final payment on
the contractor's furnishing the written consent of his surety to such
payment. The contractor defaulted, and between the time of the
execution of the surety bond and the surety's performance of its ob-
ligation, the federal government asserted tax liens against the con-
tractor. The Court of Appeals held that because the contractor had
not performed, the contract by its terms deprived him of any right
to final payment from the Housing Authority. As a consequence,
the tax lien could not attach to those funds.
While the facts of the Aetna decision are not identical to those
of the Ball case, it would seem that, at least in New York, the effect
of the latter case can be vitiated if a surety refuses to issue a per-
formance bond unless the construction contract contains a clause re-
quiring the surety's consent as a condition precedent to the con-
tractor's release of any retained sums to the subcontractor. If by
state law a subcontractor has no right to the sums due under a con-
tract unless he has met all conditions precedent as required by the
contract, then a contract conditioned upon the surety's consent to the
release of the sums to the subcontractor would effectively protect the
surety's rights. Until the surety's consent to payment is obtained,
the subcontractor would have no rights to the retained sums to which
a federal tax lien could attach. The question of whether a surety's
rights to the fund were "choate" or "inchoate" need never be raised
in any case involving a tax lien.
21357 U.S. 51 (1958).
22 See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. New York City Housing Auth., 241
F.2d 142, 144 (2d Cir. 1956).
23 4 N.Y.2d 639, 152 N.E.2d 225, 176 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1958). It should be
noted that in the Aetna case, the government argued that the question of what
property belonged to the delinquent taxpayer was a matter of federal law in
tax lien cases. United States v. Bess was decided on June 9, 1958, and the
Aetna case was decided on June 30, 1958. The court ruled against the govern-
ment's claim in the Aetna case on the strength of the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Bess.
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TAXATION - PROOF OF LIKELY TAXABLE SOURCE OF INCOME
HELD UNNECESSARY TO ESTABLISH TAX EVASION USING NET
WORTH METHOD.-Defendant was convicted of attempting to evade
the federal income tax. The conviction was based on the "net worth"
method. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set aside the
verdict and remanded the case for a new trial. The court held that
proof of a likely taxable source is an indispensable element of the net
worth method in any of its applications.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed •
the ruling of the circuit court in remanding the case for a new trial.
The Court, however, held that proof of a likely taxable source is not
necessary where all possible sources of non-taxable income are
negated. United States v. Massei, 355 U.S. 595 (1958).
The net worth method of proof of income in criminal tax evasion
prosecutions aims to demonstrate by such indirect evidence as bank
deposits, expenditures and net worth increases that the taxpayer.has
not reported a substantial portion of his taxable income.1 Using this
method the government must establish, with reasonable certainty, the
taxpayer's net worth for the beginning of the year in question.2 This
serves as a starting point to calculate future increases in the taxpayer's
assets throughout that year. This amount is then subtracted from
the taxpayer's net worth as calculated for the close of the year. The
closing-year figure is increased by amounts spent for personal ex-
penditures and is reduced by liabilities and non-taxable income. 3 If
there is substantial increase in the taxpayer's net worth, his income
tax return must necessarily reflect it.
When the net worth method was first upheld it was utilized to
corroborate direct proof of specific unreported income.4 In 1943,
however, in United States v. Johnson,5 the Court approved its use in
supporting the inference that the taxpayer, owner of a vast and
elaborately concealed network of gambling houses from which he had
declared no income, had indeed received unreported income in a sub-
stantial amount.
Since the Johnson case, the United States Supreme Court has
been asked to review an increasing number of criminal cases in which
proof of tax evasion rested on this method.6 In view of the dangers
inherent in the method and the frequency of its use the court has
1 United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950) ; United States v.
Fenwick, 177 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1949); Stinnett v. United States, 173 F.2d
129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957 (1949).2 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); United States v.
O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Sasser v. United States, 208 F.2d 535
(5th Cir. 1953); 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATioN § 55A.27a, at 123(1958).
3 Sasser v. United States, supra note 2.
4 Guzik v. United States, 54 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1931) ; Capone v. United
States, 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931).
5 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
6 See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 124 (1954).
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expressed concern regarding its implications. It has been stated that
a series of theoretical estimates and computations as to the defen-
dant's net worth, which are allowed to take the place of direct proof,7
endanger the principle that a defendant is presumed innocent until
proven guilty.8 Reiterating this position, the Supreme Court, in the
leading case of Holland v. United States,' set up certain prerequisites
which the government must establish it has fulfilled in order to prove
a prima facie case. These prerequisites comprise, in addition to the
establishment of a definite net worth for the beginning of the taxable
year: 10 full government investigation of relevant leads furnished by
the taxpayer; 1 wilfullness (which can be inferred from a consistent
pattern of under-reporting large amounts of income) ; 12 and govern-
ment negation of the possibility of the unreported income coming from
a non-taxable source (proof of a likely taxable source is deemed
sufficient) .- 
This last-stated prerequisite was the point at issue in the present
case. The circuit court, in reversing the conviction, held that proof
of a likely taxable source was indispensable in all such cases based
on the net worth method. In other circuits the view was different.
The Third Circuit, for example, has held that a taxpayer's wilful mis-
representations as to the source from which he received his income
was sufficient, in addition to evidence of unexplained increase in his
net worth, to sustain a conviction. 4 In the Second Circuit, the court
has held that the government must reasonably negate all possible
non-taxable sources and show that the unreported income came from
"some source." 15
The Supreme Court, in disagreeing with the First Circuit, de-
cided that proof of a likely taxable source is not necessary where all
possible sources of non-taxable income are negated. The Court stated
that the lower court misconstrued the holding of the Holland case,
which deemed proof of a likely taxable source sufficient-not "indis-
pensable"--in establishing that the unreported income came from a
taxable source. This decision greatly clarifies the proof necessary to
sustain a tax evasion conviction based on the net worth method. It
is only in those cases where the government has not negated the pos-
sibility that the unreported income came from non-taxable sources
that proof of a likely taxable source becomes a factor in the govern-
ment's case.
' 10 MER~ENs, LAW OF FERAL TAXATION § 55A.27a, at 119-20 (1958).
8 Demetree v. United States, 207 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1953) ; see, e.g.,
United States v. Altruda, 224 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1955).
9348 U.S. 121 (1954).
10 Id. at 132.
3. Id. at 135.
12 Id. at 139.
'13 Id. at 137.
14 United States v. Adonis, 221 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1955).
15 United States v. Ford, 237 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956), vacated as moot, 355
U.S. 38 (1957) (per curiam).
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The holding in this case appears to be sound. Since the defen-
dants in this type of prosecution are on trial for tax evasion it would
be an undue burden to compel the government to prove not only the
crime charged, but also the likely taxable source from which the un-
reported income came. Once a discrepancy is shown to exist between
the taxpayer's increase in net worth and his reported income and the
government has negated all possible non-taxable sources, it is not
unjust that he be compelled to explain this discrepancy or remain
quiet at his peril. However, in clarifying the issue the Court leaves
unanswered the question of the limits to which the government must
go in negating possible sources of non-taxable income.
X
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-DoCTOR HELD LIABLE IN DAMAGES FOR
CANCEROPHOBIA.-Plaintiff was burned by X-ray treatments admin-
istered by defendants. Approximately two years later she consulted
a dermatologist, who treated the burns and advised a checkup every
six months because the burned area might become cancerous. The
New York Court of Appeals held that an award of $15,000 for the
mental anguish of cancerophobia resulting from the dermatologist's
advice was proper, as plaintiff's consultation with another doctor was
the natural result of defendant's negligence. Ferrara v. Galluchio,
5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
Responsibility for the ultimate results of negligent acts is a rec-
ognized principle of common law.1 The doctrine that the law looks
to the proximate and not the remote cause was embodied in legal
texts by Lord Bacon.2 Proximate cause has been defined as that
which naturally leads to and might be expected to directly produce
the result.3 Common sense has been the primary tool urged by courts
for determining the real, true cause of the damage. 4 Intervention by
doctors has been recognized as one of the natural and probable con-
' See Kilduff v. Kalinowski, 136 Conn. 305, 71 A.2d 593, 595 (1950). "If
one is negligent, he is liable for all the injurious consequences that flow from
his negligence, until diverted by the intervention of some efficient cause which
makes the injury its own.. . ." Ibid. See also Christianson v. Chicago, St. P.,
M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896) ; Osborne v. Montgomery,
203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
2 "In jure non remota causa, sed proxima, spectatur. . . ." See Proximate
and Reinote Cause, 4 Am. L. Rv. 201-02 (1870). (All italicized in original.)
3 See State v. Manchester & Lawrence R.R., 52 N.H. 528, 552 (1873);
McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 436, 442 (1866).
4 See Topsham v. Lisbon, 65 Me. 449, 462 (1876). See also Smethurst
v. Congregational Church, 148 Mass. 261, 12 Am. St. Rep. 550, 553-54 (1889) ;
Hoadley v. Northern Transp. Co., 115 Mass. 304, 15 Am. Rep. 106, 109 (1874).
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